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Past and Current Trends in the
Evolution of Design Protection Law-
A Commentt
J.H. Reichman"
As you may have surmised, industrial design has posed the
intellectual property world's single most complicated puzzle-one
that has evolved over two hundred years-and I'm not going to
sort it out in a twenty minute comment.1 Today we heard a lot
about the diversity of the domestic design laws, which the Europe-
an Commission must try to reconcile in its overall efforts to harmo-
nize national intellectual property laws. I will try to show you that
there is a unifying thread beneath the surface.
I. A RECURRING CYCLICAL PATrERN
If we go back in time-twenty, fifty, or even a hundred years
-and if we exclude the unregistered design law that the United
Kingdom enacted in 1988,2 you will find all of the existing com-
t This paper was adapted from panel commentary made at the Fordham Conference
on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy held at Fordham University School
of Law on April 15-16, 1993.
* © J.H. Reichman 1993. Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law,
Nashville, Tenn.; University of Chicago, B.A. 1955; Yale University, J.D. 1979.
1. See generally J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the Legislative Agenda, 55
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281 (1992) [hereinafter Reichman, Legislative Agenda]; J.H.
Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience
in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6 (1989.1990), abridged version
reprinted in 30 INDUS. PROP. 220 (pt. 1), 257 (pt. 2) (1991) and in LA PROPRIt, INDUSTRELLE
228 (pt. 1), 271 (pt. 2) (1991) [hereinafter Reichman, Designs and New Technologies];
J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the
Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143 [hereinafter
Reichman, Design Before 1976]; J.H. Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright
Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 267 (1983-1984) [hereinafter Reichman, Comparative View].
2. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, 2 Eliz. 2, ch. 48, §§ 213-264
(U.K.).
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ponents of this international scheme already out there. But, as in
the game of musical chairs, we also find most of today's players
occupying different positions at different times. If you think,
"Country A firmly holds a certain position today," you only have
to look back fifty years earlier to see that same country was likely
to have embraced somebody else's position then, and that the
"somebody else"-Country B-is likely to have moved on to still
another position thirty to fifty years later.
From a worldwide perspective, we thus find a recurring cyclical
pattern that swings from states of chronic underprotection to states
of chronic overprotection, and then back to underprotection once
again. This two hundred-year-old cyclical pattern continues to un-
fold before our eyes.
The initial condition of underprotection typically stems from the
full patent approach, which the United States still adheres to; Swit-
zerland is also one of the last few countries, plus maybe Ireland,
to follow the full patent model. Very few designs ever qualify for
protection under a full patent approach because patent law imposes
a nonobviousness standard, whereas commercial designs normally
partake of small variations upon themes already known to the prior
art. Such variations, though commercially valuable, seldom consti-
tute an "inventive step" away from the prior art.
Historically, many countries tried to rectify the underprotection
characteristic of a full patent model by opening their copyright
laws to industrial designs, and France remains the most prominent
adherent to this "unity of art" approach. However, copyright law
inevitably overprotects product designs to such a degree that, out-
side of France, legislators soon tended to fall back on some form
of industrial property protection once again-especially a modified
patent approach-which, however, also breeds new states of
underprotection. The recurring cyclical pattern can thus be sum-
marized in the following terms:
Traditionally, the right to copyright protection is premised
on a claim that certain industrial designs are entitled to
legal recognition as art in the historical sense. The [ad-
verse] economic repercussions of such recognition flow
principally from the industrial character of the material sup-
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port in which ornamental designs are embodied. The inci-
dence of these repercussions upon any given system varies
with the extent to which the claim to recognition as art is
itself given effect. As copyright protection for designs of
useful articles expands, the . .. [anticompetitive] effects of
this expansion on the general products market induce coun-
tervailing pressures to reduce the scope of protection ac-
quired in the name of art. As protection in copyright law
correspondingly contracts, pressure for recognition of indus-
trial art as a legally protectable form of industrial property
normally increases. The tendency of industrial property law
to breed still further instances of underprotection [that is, in
sui generis laws built on modified patent principles] or
overprotection [that is, in unfair competition laws sounding
in the misappropriation rationale] then fosters renewed pres-
sures for the regulation of industrial art within the frame-
work of the laws governing literary and artistic property.'
And so it goes, round and round across the world's intellectual
property system, from one generation to the next without breaking
the cyclical pattern. Chronic underprotection in industrial property
law leads to chronic overprotection in artistic property law, which
in turn inspires further reactive reforms of industrial property law
tending to reinstate levels of underprotection that will foster re-
newed appeals to copyright law.
II. THE CYCLICAL PATTERN IN DOMESTIC LAW
We can illustrate this cycle in United States law, and it is worth
taking a few minutes to do so. Start with Mazer v. Stein4 in 1954.
Until then, all we had were design patents, only a few designs
could formally qualify for legal protection, and the federal courts
seldom enforced even issued design patents, so designers obtained
virtually no protection at all. We had chronic underprotection.
Under pressure from the Europeans, the Copyright Office persuad-
3. Reichman, Legislative Agenda, supra note 1, at 287 (quoting Reichman, Designs
Before 1976, supra note 1, at 1143).
4. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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ed the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein to open the door to copy-
right law, and the United States recognized "works of applied art"
as copyrightable subject matter for the first time.
For one moment, it looked as though we might even embrace
full copyright protection of commercial designs in the French man-
ner, but in 1958, the Copyright Office said, "No, we don't want
that, we need a sui generis design law." So, the Copyright Office
(and later the Congress) endorsed the neo-Italian standard of sepa-
rability5 and thereby shunted most three-dimensional product de-
signs out of copyright law, except for a few that are intrinsically
separable from their physical supports. For example, two-dimen-
sional fabric designs still qualify for copyright protection as graphic
art, and the statues of dancers in Mazer still qualify as sculpture
even though they are embodied in lamps. But the bulk of all prod-
uct configurations was supposed to go to a sui generis design law
built on modified copyright principles.
It was a brilliant design law, too-IFll talk about that in a sec-
ond-it was a brilliant proposal; Register Fisher's design law as
put forward in the late 1950s was really elegant.6 It would have
made a major contribution to the world's empirical knowledge of
this subject, and it might have helped us to avoid the present pre-
dicament of the European Community. But it did not get enacted.
Chairman Kastenmeier's subcommittee shot it down in 1976. So
we never got a chance to test that design law, the first one to be
carefully worked out on modified copyright principles.
Of course, we did not leave commercial designs in copyright
law; on the contrary, section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act shunt-
ed virtually all three-dimensional product designs to the design
patent law. But few designs obtained protection there, owing to
the nonobviousness criterion. Meanwhile, in the early 1960s, law-
yers started appealing to state unfair competition laws for protec-
tion against slavish imitation (known as misappropriation), and
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works)
(codifying Copyright Off. Reg. 202.10(c) of 1959); see generally Reichman, Designs
Before 1976, supra note 1, at 1181-88.
6. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 1, at 1186-1213.
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state courts welcomed these refugees from intellectual property law
with open arms.
That, however, led to the Supreme Court's Sears-Compco deci-
sions7 in 1964. What was Sears-Compco about? At stake were
invalidated design patents, whose owners turned to state law and
said, "Save us, save us!" And the state courts did intervene against
slavish imitation. But the Supreme Court said, "No, you can't do
that because it interferes with federal patents for designs." So, for
one moment, we had the prospect of massive overprotection in
state unfair competition law, but the Supreme Court preempted that
solution.
The pressure turned right back to copyright law, in the lamp
design held copyrightable by a federal district court in Esquire, Inc.
v. Ringer,8 on the eve of the 1976 Act. So, of course, Register
Ringer had to persuade Chairman Kastenmeier to codify the separa-
bility doctrine and to eject the modified lamp design from copy-
right law under the neo-Italian doctrine of separability. The differ-
ence is that, in Italy, they have a sui generis design law on modi-
fied patent principles that Italian courts have softened and made
relatively workable, while our standard of nonobviousness still
renders design patents of limited availability.
Once Register Ringer got Chairman Kastenmeier legislatively
to exclude product configurations from copyright law in 1976, she
expected them to obtain a short-term refuge in the pending sui
generis design bill, built on modified copyright principles. But
then, after twenty years of tinkering with Fisher's original bill, the
House Subcommittee refused to adopt it. Chairman Kastenmeier
balked.
As a result, we sent noncopyrightable product designs right
back to design patent law, and to the credit of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, the design patent law has been revived, it
7. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
8. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
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now works to the extent it can. 9 But no matter how well it now
works, you still only find a handful of designs that meet the statu-
tory criterion of nonobviousness.
As the House Subcommittee saw it in 1976, the result should
have been free competition in designs. Yet, any comparative ex-
pert in this field could have predicted that the United States federal
courts were not going to sit there and tolerate rampant design pira-
cy any more than courts in other countries had been willing to do.
Hence, it comes as no surprise that, since the late 1970s, the feder-
al appellate judiciary have converted section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act into a judge-made design law, one that in some respects consti-
tutes the most protectionist design law in the world. In effect, the
federal courts have embraced the misappropriation doctrine popular
in the state courts during the early 1960s and hidden it behind a
spurious theory of "appearance trade dress."' 0
Ill. APPEARANCE TRADE DRESS: FROM BoNITo BOATS TO Two
PESOS
But then the United States Supreme Court, in Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.," launched another thunderbolt by
reaffirming the spirit of Sears-Compco in 1989. True, Bonito
Boats invalidated a state law that prohibited unauthorized reproduc-
tion of product configurations by the direct molding process,
whereas the "appearance trade dress" decisions hide behind federal
law deriving from the protection of unregistered marks under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Nevertheless, Bonito Boats appeared
to reject both the misappropriation rationale as such and the mis-
guided notion that trademark law could constitute an incentive to
product innovation. Moreover, Bonito Boats invested a competi-
tor's right to reverse engineer unpatented products with constitu-
9. See, e.g., Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 1, at 11-12,
45-56; Reichman, Legislative Agenda, supra note 1, at 284-86.
10. See generally Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1341, 1357-86 (1987); Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 1,
at 81-123.
11. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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tional underpinnings.' 2 So, those of us who follow these things
began to foresee some contraction in this facile use of section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act to protect product configurations.
Then came an incredible development. In a monument to su-
perficiality, the Supreme Court handed down another opinion, in
the Two Pesos13 case, in which they implied that unregistered prod-
uct designs could be protected under section 43(a) as trade dress
without regard to secondary meaning if the designs in question
were inherently distinctive. In other words, this decision assimi-
lates every type of trade dress to trade marks and then blandly
eliminates the requirement of secondary meaning for unregistered
appearance trade dress that is inherently distinctive. Nowhere in
the Two Pesos opinion was there the slightest awareness of a possi-
ble contradiction with the pro-competitive ethos of Bonito Boats,
nor did the Court ever pause to consider why Congress had de-
clined to pass a sui generis design law.
Let us skip over a number of minor quibbles with Two Pesos
and focus instead on the principle defect of this opinion and, in-
deed, of earlier appellate decisions that kept assuring us that unreg-
istered trade dress and unregistered trade marks should not be treat-
ed differently in order to avoid creating artificial distinctions be-
tween legal labels. This argument contains a grain of truth insofar
as traditional trade dress is concerned. Because consumers do not
purchase packaging or containers for their own sake, inherently
distinctive marking of traditional trade dress may well carry a pre-
sumption of source indication.
The problem, as I have said in other forums, is not what to do
about trade dress, it is what to do about product configurations that
are the oldest and most troublesome of the many marginal cases
currently undermining the world's intellectual property system.
Historically, product configurations received only limited protection
in unfair competition law because positive intellectual property law
mandates that unpatented, noncopyrightable industrial designs
should compete in the open market unless rescued by sui generis
12. Id. at 159-64.
13. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
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design laws. "The question is not whether trade dress should be
assimilated to trademarks. It is how to protect product configura-
tions.., within a federal intellectual property system that has been
artificially carved up into semi-autonomous subcultures each at war
with the others."
1 4
The tension between Two Pesos and Bonito Boats is thus palpa-
ble, and it causes one to wonder how the federal appellate courts
will react to the introduction of this new and potentially very pro-
tectionist element into a developing area of the law. For example,
given the logic of Two Pesos, Jerome Gilson 5 asked me at the
Marshall Conference some months ago, "Do we still need a design
law?" But when I examined the early cases following Two Pesos,
I was surprised by the amount of resistance to the protection of
product configurations this decision may paradoxically have stirred
up, at least at the appellate level, as one panel after another seems
to rediscover the virtues of free competition and the limits on judi-
cial activism implicit in Bonito Boats.
IV. THE POWER OF POSITIVE LABELING
After Bonito Boats, to be sure, there was already some rethink-
ing of the functionality standard, with some federal appellate courts
expressing fears that the relaxed functionality standards in vogue
during the 1980s could produce serious anticompetitive effects. A
number of these courts even began to reinstate a modified doctrine
of aesthetic functionality.
16
Judicial concern for a more rigorous standard of functionality
14. Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 1, at 116.
15. See 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.14 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir.
1989); Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1622 (1991). But see Villeroy & Boch Keramische
Werke K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1993). A number of courts also
rejected the notion of "secondary meaning in the making" before the Supreme Court
eased the requirement of secondary meaning. See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Tele-
communications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Woodsmith Publish-
ing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990); Laureyssens v. Idea Group,
Inc., 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992).
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continues to grow after Two Pesos.17 There is also some concern
that the "inherently distinctive" standard should not apply unless
the trade dress in question is at least suggestive, if not arbitrary or
fanciful. 18  Above all, a growing number of appellate decisions
have compensated for the lack of a secondary meaning requirement
by reinstating stricter tests of potential confusion at the infringe-
ment stage and by rediscovering the corrective power of proper
labelling, especially labelling in the form of a competing trade-
mark.19 In effect, these judicial panels are increasingly prone to
ask, "How could there be a likelihood of confusion if the second
comer's trademark was on the product, if it was clearly marked?
Why doesn't clear labelling disculpate design imitation in the ab-
sence of a sui generis design law?" The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, in particular, has taken pains to stress that dissimi-
larities with respect to packaging, labelling, and brand names
would normally overcome any confusion arising from similarities
in so-called appearance trade dress, i.e., product configurations.2'
Of course, there was labeling in the 1980s, but courts striving
to convert section 43(a) into a general-purpose misappropriation
law tended to ignore it in the presence of product simulation. In
this regard, the recent line of cases, stressing either the arbitrary
nature of the dress or a lack of confusion, is particularly striking
because the Supreme Court itself appeared to ignore both the de-
17. See, e.g., Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d
628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141); Keystone Retaining
Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But see Abbott
Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1992).
18. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577
(2d Cir. 1993).
19. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033 (2d
Cir. 1992); Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also
CJC Holdings Co. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 F.2d 60, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1992) (stress-
ing that when a design "was not protected by patent or copyright ... a corporation
normally has a right to make 'knock-off' copies"); Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d 628.
However, courts will apply the confusion tests to consumers other than direct pur-
chasers. See; e.g., Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (stressing post-sale confusion).
20. See L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d 1117; Braun, 975 F.2d 815.
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scriptive qualities of the restaurant decor in Two Pesos and the
power of the second comer's own trade mark to rectify possible
confusion owing to similarities of dress.
The most impressive of all the recent opinions is surely that of
Judge Newman in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co.,21 one
of the Federal Circuit's latest decisions concerning designs of ath-
letic shoes, which was handed down early in 1993. While staunch-
ly upholding a design patent on the shoes in question, Judge
Newman issued a warning call to those courts that have blandly
tried to convert section 43(a) of the Lanham Act into a judge-made
design law. She admonishes that similarities of product configura-
tions in and of themselves do not constitute a likelihood of confu-
sion or of mistake, nor are they a form of deception. In the ab-
sence of these taints, the public enjoys an absolute right to copy
unpatented, noncopyrightable useful articles. Even distinctive prod-
uct designs cannot be shielded from copying if the second comer
adequately dispels confusion by other means, and especially by
prominent use of his or her own trade names and trademarks.22
Above all, Judge Newman explicitly declared that Sears-
Compco and Bonito Boats, taken together, prevent the federal
courts from exceeding the Congressional mandate as to section
43(a) by judicially creating a new form of industrial design protec-
tion without legislative enactment of a sui generis design law.23 In
effect, by reading Two Pesos against Bonito Boats, the Federal
Circuit has distilled the kind of analytical framework applicable to
product configurations that is altogether lacking in the Supreme
Court's own essay in Two Pesos.
Judge Newman's opinion also reveals the dilemma that con-
fronts the courts when Bonito Boats and Two Pesos are read to-
gether. On the one hand, less demanding standards of eligibility
make it easier to tolerate overprotection of product configurations
in federal unfair competition law by expanding the "appearance
21. 988 F.2d 1117.
22. Id. at 1130-34; see also Braun, 975 F.2d 815; CJC Holdings, 979 F.2d at 65-
66; Coach Leatherware Co. v. Ann Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991).
23. L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1117.
[Vol. 4:357
DEVELOPMENTS ON INDUSTRIAL DESIGN
trade dress" heresy, as some judiciale panels are still prone to do.24
On the other hand, courts seeking to reinstate a more rigorous de-
gree of competition in the spirit of Bonito Boats must close their
eyes to the level of underprotection that results from design piracy
under modem conditions, unless Congress decides to enact a sui
generis design protection law to meet this challenge.
In short, trademark and unfair competition laws cannot substi-
tute for a true design protection law, nor can they be used to stimu-
late innovation and product development without anti-competitive
effects that are well known to legal historians. As Stephen Ladas
pointed out, trademark and unfair competition laws lack the limita-
tions and safeguards that positive intellectual property law estab-
lishes in order to balance the long-term public interest against
short-term restraints on trade. To the extent that such laws attempt
to remedy the perceived inadequacies of other legal disciplines,
they set up a competing forum capable of furnishing longer and
tougher forms of protection on softer conditions. 26 At the limit, the
misappropriation branch of unfair competition law provides a ritual
formula for suspending the rules of competition in favor of perpet-
ual monopolies that are conferred on a hit-or-miss basis for reasons
that vary with the outlook of single judges.
V. COPYRIGHT-LIKE PROTECTION OF FUNCTIONAL DESIGNS
The need to enact a sui generis design law in the interest of our
domestic design industries seems clear.27 In this connection, our
24. See, e.g., Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., 999
F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1993); Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063
(7th Cir. 1992); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 3028 (1992); see also Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165 (11th Cir.
1991) (antedating Two Pesos).
25. See supra notes 16-19. The design piracy left undeterred in Bonito Boats
itself, where an innovative hull design was duplicated with no corresponding invest-
ment in research and development, gives cause for concern.
26. See, e.g., 2 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NA-
TIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 967-68 (1975). But see Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark
Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 887 (approving the "appearance
trade dress" approach).
27. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-Like Protection for Designs, 19 U. BALT.
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GATT negotiators have either jumped into, or been pushed into,
accepting a provision in the Draft TRIPS Agreement that would
almost certainly require the United States to adopt a sui generis
design law, whether or not it retained the present design patent law
on the books.2' The problem is that, as Hugh Griffiths just in-
formed us, the Commission of the European Communities is about
to endorse some novel and fairly radical solutions; and my fear is
that, once the United States began to consider reform proposals in
earnest, the EC model might seem irresistible, especially if it was
supported by certain lobbying groups already at work over here.
I refer particularly to the fact that the EC proposal would con-
tain both a registered and an unregistered option, and that it would
basically protect both aesthetically determined appearance designs
and functionally determined appearance designs on modified copy-
right principles for a fairly long period of time. Most design laws,
besides requiring registration, still protect only aesthetically deter-
mined product configurations for a relatively short period of time
and exclude functionally determined designs altogether. The Unit-
ed Kingdom's unregistered design law, enacted in 1988, does pro-
tect both aesthetically and functionally determined designs for a
relatively short period of time, although that country's registered
design law, also amended in 1988, continues to protect only ap-
pearance designs and not functionally determined designs for a
long period of time.2 9
The EC proposal clearly contains some interesting features.
One is the possibility of acquiring a year or two of protection
against slavish imitation without any registration at all. Another
interesting feature is the resort to modified copyright principles,
L. REV. 308 (1989-1990); William T. Fryer, III, Industrial Design Protection in the
United States of America-Present Situation and Plans for Revision, 19 U. BALT. L.
REV. 198 (1989-1990); Reichman, Legislative Agenda, supra note 1.
28. See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round:
Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Mar-
ket, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171 (1993) (discussing Articles 25-26
of the Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, In-
cluding Trade in Counterfeit Goods).
29. See, e.g., Christine Fellner, The New United Kingdom Industrial Design Law,
19 U. BALT. L. REV. 369 (1989-1990).
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rather than to modified patent principles, although the EC proposal
is much less clear in this regard than the United Kingdom's unreg-
istered design right. In fact, there appears to be little consensus
concerning the standards of eligibility applicable under the EC
model.
But the EC proposal (and the United Kingdom's unregistered
design right) both become radical the moment they seek to extend
copyright-like protection to functionally determined designs that
manifest no significant creative contribution; the EC proposal
would confer an exorbitant term of protection as well. Such solu-
tions turn the competitive ethos on its ear. Tiaditionally, every
unpatented, noncopyrightable product innovation was subject to an
absolute right in third parties to compete by lawful means of re-
verse engineering. In legal terms, this is what Sears-Compco and
Bonito Boats continue to teach. Yet, every single product on the
general products market carries a functional design, and both the
United Kingdom's unregistered design right and the EC proposal
would, in effect, protect virtually all save the most commonplace
functional designs. The only certain exceptions, besides utterly
commonplace designs, are for that rarity of rarities, the design
whose functionality can only be achieved by one particular mode
of implementation. Otherwise, both the United Kingdom's unregis-
tered design right and the proposed EC model tend to override
classical free-market premises and organize in their stead a system
in which virtually every product sold on the products market comes
freighted with the exclusive rights of intellectual property laws.
In the past, countries willing to protect unpatented functional
designs enacted utility model laws requiring standards of inventive
activity that were only moderately less exigent than the
nonobviousness standard of patent law.3" Countries that protect
30. See, e.g., 2 LADAS, supra note 26, at 949-56; TERUO DOI, THE INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW OF JAPAN 68-70 (1980); E. Hausser, Utility Models: The Experience of the
Federal Republic of Germany, 26 INDUS. PROP. 314 (1987). However, the adoption of
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 in the United States introduced legal
protection of one class of functional designs under soft prerequisites, like those of
copyright law, rather than under hard prerequisites, like those of patent law. See, e.g.,
J.H. Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights in University Generated Research
1993]
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utility models, including Germany, Italy, Japan, and a growing
number of developing countries, seek to encourage small-scale
innovation that is particularly suited to local conditions. These
laws nonetheless require evidence of a significant innovative contri-
bution3' because the external configuration of virtually every utili-
tarian product affects its functional efficiency or performance.
Proposals to protect functional designs on much softer standards
than those of utility model laws or, indeed, in return for no signifi-
cant quantum of creative achievement whatsoever, constitute an
unprecedented assault on the free-market principles that underlie
both domestic and international trade.
Moreover, such proposals complicate an already difficult sub-
ject by casting fresh doubts on what exactly the sponsors of these
legislative initiatives are trying to accomplish and why. If their
object is to protect all innovative shapes or forms that have an
industrial application, it begs the question as to why this type of
innovation, but not others, should escape the price-setting function
of the marketplace. If their concern is to encourage investment in
innovation that remains particularly vulnerable to appropriation by
free-riders, one wonders why other forms of incremental innovation
that are at least as socially beneficial as functional designs should
not be rescued from a similar fate.32 For example, why not protect
unpatentable biogenetically altered organisms under a parallel sui
generis regime? And why tolerate exorbitant protection of industri-
al literature (that is, computer programs) in copyright law, only to
confine industrial art and functional designs generally to a sui ge-
neris regime?
The Case of Computer Programs, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 51, 110-116 (1992).
31. For a conceptual clarification of the pristine function of a utility model law
before it degenerates into a petty patent law, see Jerome H. Reichman, Electronic Infor-
mation Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 24 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. [I.I.C.] 451-55 (1993).
32. Cf Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Princi-
pled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 580-89, 606-09 (1985).
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VI. INCREMENTAL INNOVATION BEARING KNow-How ON ITS
FACE
I have elsewhere suggested that the real problem facing the
design industries is the same problem that faces both computer
software manufacturers and biogenetic engineers, namely, the diffi-
culties of protecting incremental innovation bearing know-how on
its face:33
[M]uch of today's most advanced technology enjoys a less
favorable competitive position than that of conventional
machinery because the unpatentable, intangible know-how
responsible for its commercial value becomes embodied in
products that are distributed on the open market. A product
of the new technologies, such as a computer program or an
integrated circuit design, or even a biogenetically altered
organism may thus bear its know-how on its face, a condi-
tion that renders it as vulnerable to rapid appropriation by
second comers as any published literary or artistic work.
From this perspective, a major problem with the kinds
of innovative know-how underlying important new technol-
ogies is that they do not lend themselves to secrecy even
when they represent the fruit of enormous investment in
research and development. Because third parties can rapid-
ly duplicate the embodied information and offer virtually
the same products at lower prices than those of the origina-
tors, there is no secure interval of lead time in which to
recuperate the originators' initial investment or their losses
from unsuccessful essays, not to mention the goal of turning
a profit.
.. From a behavioral standpoint, investors in applied sci-
entific know-how find the copyright paradigm attractive
because of its inherent disposition to supply artificial lead
33. See J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How:
Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 639, 652-68, 714-17 (1989).
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time to all comers without regard to innovative merit and
without requiring originators to preselect the products that
are most worthy of protection.34
The long-term conclusion is that the world's intellectual proper-
ty system needs a law to protect applied know-how far more than
it needs another batch of sui generis design laws. In this respect,
any sui generis design protection law, even if limited to appearance
designs, represents merely one of numerous legal metaphors that
legislators have used to provide indirect protection of unpatented,
noncopyrightable know-how under a classical intellectual property
system dominated by the patent and copyright paradigms. This
topic, introduced in my recent studies, is more fully explored in a
work in progress entitled Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms.35,
Direct protection of applied know-how would require, however,
a higher degree of consensus concerning legal means and economic
ends than currently exists, and it has nothing to do with the auto-
mobile and tractor industries' thinly disguised demand for trade
protection in the spare parts market.36 Conferring exclusive rights
on routine functional designs lacking any significant creative con-
tribution cannot be reconciled with either the theoretical and eco-
nomic underpinnings of classical intellectual property law or with
the conceptual underpinnings of a new paradigm devised to protect
incremental innovation bearing know-how on its face.
To the extent that an interim solution is needed, little harm
would result from protecting appearance designs-but not function-
ally determined designs-on modified copyright principles for a
34. Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 1, at 137, 144 (citations
omitted).
35. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
in INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 325-49 (William F. Korthals Altes
et al. eds., 1992) (conference proceedings containing excerpts from a work in progress).
36. See, e.g., Kenneth Enborg, Industrial Design Protection in the Automobile Indus-
try, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 227 (1989-1990); James F. Fitzpatrick, Industrial Design Protec-
tion and Competition in Automobile Replacement Parts-Back to Monopoly Profits?, 19
U. BALT. L. REV. 233 (1989-1990); William Thompson, Product Protection Under Cur-
rent and Proposed Design Laws, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 271 (1989-1990).
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very short period of time. This was, in essence, the elegant Ameri-
can proposal of the 1950s-Register Fisher's proposal-which was
far ahead of its time.37 Such a law would not resolve all of the
problems that need to be dealt with; but in my view, the deepest
and most serious problems will require us to devise a third para-
digm dealing with applied know-how that breaks with the mature
patent and copyright paradigms. Indeed, a proper know-how law
would not resemble the typical intellectual property model at all.
Of this, more will be said when my research colleagues and I pub-
lish our ideas about the proper basis for protecting industrial litera-
ture, i.e., computer programs.3 .
Meanwhile, as regards industrial art, the oldest and most per-
plexing hybrid subject matter in the world's intellectual property
system, the first rule of thumb ought to be primum non nuocere
-first, do no harm. A design law that protects virtually all func-
tional designs for a relatively long period of time, without requiring
any appreciable creative contribution, fails this test. In the name
of overcoming design piracy, it banishes honest competition to the
margins of the system and multiplies spurious monopoly interests,
just at a time when an integrated world market needs to rid itself
of vestigial protectionist customs inherited from an anti-entrepre-
neurial political tradition.
37. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38. See Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (unpublished work in
progress); see also Pamela Samuelson, A Case Study on Computer Programs, in GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 284-318
(Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993).
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